We use the voluntary contribution mechanism to investigate whether smaller action sets lead to higher cooperation rates. We …nd that this is the case for groups of four players.
Introduction
The voluntary contribution mechanism (VCM) is often referred to as the "n-person Prisoner's Dilemma". The two games share similar payo¤ properties and both have a unique Paretoine¢ cient Nash equilibrium. However, despite this a¢ nity, actual behavior in the two games is often di¤erent: Sally (1995, p.62) writes that "there are numerous [prisoner's dilemma] experiments in which subjects cooperated very frequently and e¤ectively". In contrast, cooperation almost always unravels with repetition in VCM experiments (e.g. Zelmer, 2003) . 1 The most notable di¤erence between the two games is the size of the action set. Players in prisoners'dilemmas (PDs) can select from two actions (cooperate, defect), while players in the VCM usually have many more actions from which to choose. It is therefore possible that the higher rates of cooperation in PD are (partly) due to the smaller size of the action set.
However, given that experiments tend to di¤er on more than one dimension (e.g. group size, relative payo¤s) it is di¢ cult to draw robust conclusions from the existing data.
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This paper investigates whether the size of the action set matters for cooperation. This fundamental question has surprisingly been overlooked despite the large body of research examining factors that promote cooperative behaviour in social-dilemma experiments and inspite of the observed di¤erences in behaviour in PD and VCM. Our paper aims to …ll this gap in the literature. 
The treatment variable is the size of the action set. In the (R)estricted treatments players have two actions, c i f0; 10g: In the (U )nrestricted treatments players have eleven actions, c i f0; 1; 2; :::; 10g: In essence, the former is a PD, while the latter is a standard VCM.
Procedures
The game is repeated 20 times without changing group composition. As PDs are typically studied using groups of two individuals and VCMs using groups of four individuals we decided to examine the impact of the action set under both group sizes. That is, G f2:4g: This provides a robustness check for our …ndings.
In the treatments with G = 2, the return from the public account is = 0:7. In treatments with G = 4; = 0:4: Note that our aim is to test the impact of the action set in two di¤erent cases and not to compare di¤erences across group sizes. Hence, the experiment does not control for the increase in the social bene…t that results from the increase of the group size (see Isaac et al., 1994) . Table 1 summarizes the experimental design.
The number of repetitions, equation 1, the instructions, and the values of and G were common knowledge amongst participants. The conversion rate used was 7 EMU= 1 Australian Dollar. Sessions lasted approximately one hour and average earnings were A$34.6 for group size G = 2; and A$32.4 for G = 4. The experiment was conducted using z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007 ).
Results
The fact that the choice variable is discrete in treatment U and binary in treatment R raises the question of how to compare behavior across treatments. One way of doing this is by comparing the number of times that subjects contributed zero (or ten) in each treatment. This comparison is however not informative as there are many cases in U where 0 < c i < 10. As a result, the number of observations where c i = 0 and c i = 10; is higher in treatment R for all G.
Another way to compare behavior is to transform the discrete variable to a binary one. We Figure 1 shows that, despite the lax de…nition in treatment U , there are more cooperative actions when the action set is restricted (p-value= :04; Fisher's exact test). In total, 24 percent of the actions in R can be classi…ed as cooperative, in contrast to 12 percent in U: The frequency of C T;t i declines over time in both treatments. Figure 2 shows that the size of the action set does not a¤ect behavior when G = 2. While there seems to be some di¤erence in the number of cooperative actions in the …rst 5 periods this di¤erence disappears over time (p-value= :67; Fisher's exact test). 2 In both treatments, nearly half of the actions can be classi…ed as cooperative for most of the experiment. 3 Table 2 reports the results from probit regressions with group random e¤ects. The regression analysis allows us to control for time e¤ects, individual characteristics and also the decisions of other group members in the previous period. The dependent variable is C T;t i . As in-dependent variables we include Average Contribution of Others in t-1 ( P n j=1;j6 =i c t 1 j )=(n 1), and the interaction of this variable with treatment dummy U, a gender dummy (Male), a dummy for academic background in Economics (Economics), and period dummies.
The results show that when G = 4; individuals are more likely to take a cooperative action in treatment R the higher the contribution of their peers is. However, this is not the case in treatment U as indicated by the negative coe¢ cient of the interaction term. When G = 2; the likelihood that an individual takes a cooperative action increases with the contribution of his peers irrespective of the size of the action set. This likelihood is even greater in treatment R.
Discussion
The results from the experiment show that groups of four individuals cooperate more with a restricted action set. No e¤ect is observed for groups of two individuals. What could explain these …ndings?
One explanation could be that individuals make errors. Restricting the available choices, however, should help subjects in discovering their dominant strategy. Moreover, the "error" of contributing the full endowment is more costly than the "error" of contributing a smaller fraction of the endowment. Therefore, quantal-response equilibrium predicts that subjects in our experiment should be less likely to err when the action set is restricted (see Palfrey and Prisbrey, 1996) . Hence, this explanation cannot account for our results.
Another explanation is that individuals are forward-looking and believe that their contributions have a signaling value. Hence, by contributing they might encourage others to do the same. Isaac et al. (1994) propose such a model in which each individual is assumed to have a subjective probability function about the likelihood of his signal being successful. 4 A wellknown fact is that many individuals are willing to contribute to the public account as long as others do the same (Croson, 2007; Fischbacher et al., 2001 ). Conditional cooperators should be more likely to respond to a signal when there are only two actions available (contribute fully, don't contribute), as they know that all conditional cooperators will take the same action if they decide to reciprocate the signal. This is supported by the regression results for groups of four players in Table 2 . Consequently, forward-looking individuals will also be more willing to signal when the action set is restricted.
The size of the action set is less important in the special case of two-player groups: player i can signal his intention to cooperate simply by continuing to contribute a high fraction of his endowment even after player j contributes little to the public account. That is, player j's response does not depend on her expectation about how other's will react to the signal. In fact, for two-player groups, the unrestricted action set permits players to send less costly signals and makes responding less risky. This is supported by Figure 2 and the positive coe¢ cient of the interaction term in Table 2 .
Our results suggest that the size of the action set should not be ignored when analyzing situations where signaling could occur: larger action sets could make collusion more di¢ cult, but also lead to e¢ ciency losses in gift-exchange relations and social dilemmas. Probit regressions with group random effects, Standard errors in parentheses, Regression includes period dummies, ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
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